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I. INTRODUCTION
Three kinds of innovation are commonly associated with the early
federal courts: establishing the institution of judicial review without any
clear authorization for doing so, using judicial review to define property
rights more expansively than would have been anticipated by contemporaries,
and employing fundamental principles derived from natural or “higher”
law for this purpose.1 I will argue that the early federal courts were far
less innovative in these three respects than most scholars have supposed.
First, the Framers of the Federal Constitution seem to have anticipated
that the new federal courts would exercise the power of judicial review,
and to have understood judicial review as a judicial practice that did not
require specific authorization in a written constitution.2 Second, the
Framers expected that in exercising the power of judicial review the
federal courts would protect certain conventional property rights not
stated in constitutional provisions.3 Third, as the Framers expected, the
federal courts of this era neither relied on nor endorsed using higher law
as a basis for determining the validity of statutes affecting property
rights.4
II. AT THE FOUNDING: TWO PARAMETERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The subject of judicial review came up from time to time during the
Constitutional Convention in 1787. Twelve delegates made remarks that
seem to assume some form of judicial review as an ordinary judicial
practice.5 No delegate manifested a lack of familiarity with the concept.
Some delegates had already exercised the power of judicial review
themselves, as state court judges,6 or advocated the lawfulness of

1. Higher law in this context refers to “a law that is not written in constitutions
but which is behind and beneath such documents, a law that man does not make but
which he may discover and apply.” BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN
INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 297 (1931).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 5–22.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 24–38.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 39–55.
5. See NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY
JAMES MADISON (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1987) (Elbridge Gerry, Rufus
King at 61; Roger Sherman, James Madison, Gouverneur Morris at 304–05; James
Wilson, Nathaniel Gorham at 336–37; Gouverneur Morris at 339; Luther Martin at 340;
George Mason at 341; John Rutledge at 343; James Madison at 352–53; Gouverneur
Morris at 463; Oliver Ellsworth at 510; Hugh Williamson at 511; James Wilson at 518;
James Madison at 539; Gouverneur Morris at 542; James Madison at 543; and James
Madison at 631).
6. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the
“Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1030
(2001).
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judicial review as attorneys.7 Courts in at least seven states had already
exercised or endorsed some form of judicial review.8 A majority of the
delegates had legal training.9 Delegates James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton, writing later as Publius, took judicial review for granted in
discussing the future federal courts.10
No provision in the proposed Constitution referred to judicial review,
however.11 Judicial review was never the subject of sustained discussion
at the Convention, and no delegate moved to authorize the federal courts
to exercise judicial review. Two delegates expressed disapproval.12 Before
the Convention, the power of judicial review had generated considerable
opposition13 as well as approval.14 Some scholars have concluded that
the Convention did not reach any meaningful consensus as to whether or
how the federal courts would exercise a power of judicial review, and
accordingly discounted the Convention proceedings as a source reflecting
contemporary understanding of judicial review or expectations regarding
how it would be practiced by the federal courts.15
7. See William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 455, 490 (2005).
8. See CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
88–121 (2d ed. 1932); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1135–45 (1987); Treanor, supra note 7, at 475–97.
9. See Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1037.
10. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524–28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961). According to Hamilton, opponents of ratification had “upon many
occasions” decried “the supposed danger of judiciary encroachments on the legislative
authority.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), id., at 545.
11. Judicial review is arguably implied by Article III, Section 2, and Article VI.
12. See NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5 (John Mercer at 462 and John Dickinson
at 463). Dickinson said he was “at the same time at a loss what expedient to substitute.”
Id. at 463. Mercer and Dickinson represented Maryland and Delaware, respectively;
apparently neither states’ courts had yet exercised or endorsed judicial review. See
HAINES, supra note 8, at 88–121.
13. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION
93–99 (1988); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–
1787, at 302–05, 459 (1998); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 132–35 (1893).
14. According to Elbridge Gerry, state judges had “set aside laws as being
[against] the Constitution. . . . with general approbation.” See NOTES OF DEBATES, supra
note 5, at 61.
15. LEVY, supra note 13, at 99–110; SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 42–43 (1990); J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG
ROBE 230–32 (1989); Treanor, supra note 7, at 469–70. But see SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER,
TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 112 (1995); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 175–76 (1996); Sherry, supra note 8, at 1129.
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The question of whether the Convention intended to authorize judicial
review reflects a dubious premise: that delegates would have thought the
federal courts needed formal authorization to conduct judicial review.
State courts were exercising the power of judicial review already,
without any authorization in their states’ constitutions.16 Judicial review
had never been formally authorized in England, where Chief Justice
Coke had memorably claimed the power to determine the validity of
Acts of Parliament according to longstanding common law principles.17
American patriots, too, had invoked an unwritten, ancient English constitution
that set limits to the power of Parliament.18 English and American courts
that had exercised judicial review or endorsed it in principle always
explained it as an inherent or implied duty.19 Therefore the fact that the
Convention did not formally authorize judicial review does not imply
that the delegates were undecided about judicial review or opposed to it.
Given the fact that courts practicing or endorsing judicial review had
never regarded formal authorization from outside the courts as essential,
Convention delegates probably thought that federal judges would feel
they had the authority to exercise this notionally conventional power
unless the Constitution prohibited judicial review.20
Regardless of whether the Convention proceedings might be regarded
as reflecting any consensus among the delegates regarding the legitimacy or
the likelihood of judicial review in the federal courts, however, the
Convention provides a useful baseline for evaluating the degree of
innovation practiced by the federal courts in later years. Delegates who
seemed to take judicial review for granted showed a consistent or
compatible understanding of the scope of judicial review in two basic
16. Sherry, supra note 8, at 1135.
17. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 653 (K.B. 1610); see Edward S.
Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L.
REV. 365, 367–73 (1928). Some scholars have concluded that Bonham’s Case was
intended to address statutory construction rather than judicial review, and Coke himself
later wrote that Parliament’s legislative power was absolute. EDWARDO COKE, THE FOURTH
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF
COURTS 36 (1797). Eighteenth-century Americans, however, seem to have understood
Bonham’s Case as asserting a power of judicial review.
18. See CHARLES F. MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
1760–1776, at 43–49 (1933); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 75–76 (1986); Corwin, supra note
17, at 394–98 (suggesting that the influence of Bonham’s Case was felt in America as
early as the seventeenth century); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:
Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 865–69
(1978).
19. See Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 18,
23–26 (2003).
20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 543;
Hamburger, supra note 19, at 38–40.
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respects. First, they anticipated that the fundamental law used by courts
to determine the validity of statutes under the Federal Constitution would
not consist merely of the constitutional text.21 Second, they assumed
that the federal courts would not invoke natural law or natural rights
principles as a test of the validity of a statute.22 Questions of property
rights and economic liberty figured prominently in the delegates’
hypothetical discussions of judicial review, so their discussions can offer
useful if fragmentary evidence regarding the Framers’ perceptions and
expectations of how judicial review would apply to statutes modifying
rights of property owners and other economic actors in the new federal
courts.
A. Judicial Review Would Not Be Confined to
Enforcing the Constitutional Text
Those Convention delegates who assumed that the federal courts
would exercise judicial review evidently expected that federal courts
would declare some kinds of laws void even if they did not violate a
constitutional provision. Oliver Ellsworth said it was not “necessary” to
prohibit the national legislature from enacting ex post facto laws,
because “there was no lawyer, no civilian23 who would not say that ex
post facto laws were void of themselves.”24 Ellsworth evidently assumed
that federal ex post facto laws, if challenged in court, would be declared
void even if the Constitution did not expressly prohibit them, because
the illegitimacy of ex post facto laws—among “the first principles of
Legislation,” according to James Wilson25—was already so well-established.
Similarly, Gouverneur Morris opposed expressly prohibiting states from
interfering with private contracts because “[t]he [j]udicial power of the
U.S. will be a protection in cases within their jurisdiction.”26 No delegate

21. See infra text accompanying notes 24–38.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 39–55.
23. By “civilian” Ellsworth meant someone who is an expert in civil law.
Similarly, Daniel Carroll refers to “civilians or others.” NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note
5, at 511.
24. Id. at 510. Justice Thompson made a similar assertion in Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 303–04 (1827) (“No [s]tate [c]ourt would, I presume, sanction
and enforce an ex post facto law, if no such prohibition was contained in the constitution
of the United States.”).
25. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 511.
26. Id. at 542.

827

HART.FINAL.DOC

10/15/2008 10:14:14 AM

challenged the premise that courts would use such well-established
extratextual principles in judicial review.27
James Madison reminded fellow delegates that in Rhode Island, “the
Judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced.”28
This was an allusion to Trevett v. Weeden, in which the highest court of
Rhode Island had declared void a new law requiring creditors to accept
paper money as legal tender for existing debts.29 Madison and other
delegates, evidently familiar with the existing state constitutions, would
have known that Rhode Island had chosen to keep its colonial charter
instead of adopting a written constitution,30 and understood that the
Rhode Island court had not relied on a written provision of fundamental
law in overturning the tender law. Some probably knew that in Connecticut,
the other state without a written constitution, the highest court had
already held a statute void,31 and that other states’ courts had held
statutes void on grounds not articulated in their written constitutions.32
Roger Sherman, responding to George Mason’s proposal to add a federal
bill of rights to the Constitution, said that a bill of rights was unnecessary:
“The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution;
and being in force are sufficient.”33 Sherman’s remark seems to imply
that individual rights recited in state bills of rights would not become
unavailable to litigants challenging a federal statute simply because they
were not recited in the Federal Constitution. Some of those present
would have known that state judges had endorsed using principles
inferable from written constitutions as grounds for declaring a statute
void,34 and that principles of the unwritten English constitution, as

27. The Convention later expressly prohibited ex post facto laws. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 3. This does not necessarily mean that the delegates disagreed with the
statements of Ellsworth and Morris about fundamental law, however. Some delegates
questioned whether courts would have the fortitude to declare statutes void despite
pressure from the legislature. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 304–05.
28. Id. at 305.
29. Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1786). Although the court’s opinion in Trevett v.
Weeden was never published, the defendant’s argument appeared as a pamphlet. See 1
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 417–29 (1971).
30. 1 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE, 1776–1850, at 129 (1898).
31. The Symsbury Case, 1 Kirby 444 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1785); see Treanor, supra
note 7, at 487–89. Connecticut had declared its independence by an act of the legislature
stating that the colony charter of 1662 would “remain the Civil Constitution of this
State.” 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 289–90. The act contained a very brief recital of
rights, consisting essentially of due process. Id. at 290.
32. Elbridge Gerry asserted that in Massachusetts the governor’s salary was
“secured by the spirit of the Constitution.” NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 39.
33. Id. at 630. Mason responded that “[t]he Laws of the U.S. are to be paramount
to State Bills of Rights,” an objection Sherman left unanswered. Id.
34. See Treanor, supra note 7, at 474–75, 485–86, 488–89, 493–495.
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conceived by Americans, had been invoked by attorneys as grounds for
holding statutes void in state courts.35
During the ratification process, Federalist writers consistently argued
that citizens’ rights would remain enforceable, responding to complaints
that the proposed federal constitution lacked a bill of rights.36 In
Federalist No. 44, Madison considerably expanded the scope of Ellsworth’s
argument at the Convention that ex post facto laws were void regardless
of any specific prohibition in a written constitution:
Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every
principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the
declarations prefixed to some of the State Constitutions, and all of them are
prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own
experience has taught us nevertheless, that additional fences against these
dangers ought not to be omitted.37

Similarly, some Anti-Federalist advocates contended that the federal
courts would go beyond the literal text of the Constitution in finding
grounds for declaring state statutes void. Brutus, for example, warned that
the federal courts would be “empowered, to explain the constitution
according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the
words or letter.”38

35. See 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 357 (Julius Goebel Jr. ed.,
Columbia Univ. Press 1964); 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 419–21.
36. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 579
(“[B]ills of rights, in the sense and in the extent they are contended for, . . . would even
be dangerous.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), id., at 154 n.* (“NewYork has no bill of her rights . . . . No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions of
[some of] the other States . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison), id., at 247
(“Is a Bill of Rights essential to liberty?”).
37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), id., at 301 (emphasis added). This
passage was quoted with approval by Justice Thompson in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213, 304–05 (1827). See also id. at 312 (“[The Contracts Clause stated] a
great, yet not a new principle. It is a principle inherent in every sound and just system of
laws, independent of express constitutional restraints.”) (second emphasis added); id. at
266 (majority opinion) (“[Bills of attainder and ex post facto laws] are oppressive,
unjust, and tyrannical, and, as such, are condemned by the universal sentence of civilized
man.”).
38. Essays of Brutus No. 11, in THE ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST
PAPERS 83 (David Wootton ed., 2003).
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B. Courts Would Not Use Natural Rights As a Basis for
Declaring a Statute Void
Some scholars have inferred that Convention delegates intended or
expected that courts would use natural law or natural rights in judging
the validity of a statute.39 This exaggerates the scope of judicial review
reflected in the proceedings. Although the delegates repeatedly referred
to existing or hypothetical laws as “unjust,”40 and left important questions
of economic justice exposed to the vagaries of national politics,41 they
did not expect courts to declare a law void simply because it was unjust.
For the Framers, justice and law were distinct domains; injustice did not
entail unconstitutionality. Delegates distinguished between laws that
were unjust and laws that a reviewing court would pronounce void. James
Wilson, a future law professor and Supreme Court Justice, said, “Laws
may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive;
and yet may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in
refusing to give them effect.”42 Similarly, George Mason, the prominent
Virginia lawyer credited with drafting the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, stressed this distinction while arguing that the federal judiciary
should assist the executive in exercising the veto power over bills passed
by Congress. The judges, he said, “could declare an unconstitutional law
void. But with respect to every law[,] however unjust[,] oppressive or
pernicious, which did not come plainly under this description, they
would be under the necessity as Judges to give it a free course.”43
Madison’s later comments on Jefferson’s draft of a constitution for
Virginia also treated injustice and unconstitutionality as distinct.44

39. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 139–44; see generally Grey, supra note 18; Sherry,
supra note 8, at 1158–60.
40. See NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5 (James Madison at 77; James Madison at
145; Gouverneur Morris at 255; James Wilson at 337; George Mason at 341; Oliver
Ellsworth at 498; and James Madison at 543).
41. The Convention declined to prohibit Congress from interfering with the
obligation of contract, despite Elbridge Gerry’s efforts. Id. at 642. Madison was unable
to secure consensus for drafting a contract clause that would ban state laws altering the
obligation of future contracts as well as laws altering the obligation of contracts already
in being. Id. at 542–43. The Convention did not prohibit Congress from issuing bills of
credit or making something other than gold or silver a legal tender, though these issues
were discussed. Id. at 470–71. Paper money had generally been regarded as unjust.
E.g., id. at 144.
42. Id. at 337.
43. Id. at 341.
44. See James Madison, Observations on Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution for
Virginia, in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 652 (Philip B. Kurland et al. ed., 1987) (“A
revisionary power is meant as a check to precipitate, to unjust, and to unconstitutional
laws.”).
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Hamilton’s discussion of the judiciary in Federalist No. 78, similarly,
distinguishes between “infractions of the constitution” and “the injury of
the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial
laws.”45 Laws violating the Constitution could be declared void, but all
that courts could do with “unjust and partial laws” would be to construe
them narrowly, “mitigating the severity, and confining the operation of
such laws.”46 Similarly, Hamilton elsewhere refers in the alternative to a
“pernicious or unconstitutional law.”47
James Madison, who categorically condemned state laws affecting
contracts as unjust,48 urged the Convention to give Congress an absolute
power to veto state laws instead of merely prohibiting the states from
interfering with contracts. “Evasions might and would be devised by the
ingenuity of [state] Legislatures.”49 Similarly, Madison later argued that
the “jurisdiction of the supreme Court” would be “insufficient” to prevent
“injurious acts of the States” because of “all the shapes which these
could assume;” a “[federal] negative on the State laws” was therefore
essential.50 An absolute veto was essential, Madison argued in a letter to
Jefferson after the Convention, because “[i]njustice may be effected by
such an infinitude of legislative expedients, that . . . it can only be controuled
by some provision which reaches all cases whatsoever.”51 Hamilton
made the same argument in Federalist No. 80.52 It is implicit in
Madison’s remarks that an unjust law evading the terms of a contracts
provision in the Constitution would not be held void by the courts
simply because it was unjust. Madison proposed a prohibition on state
embargoes because they were categorically “unjust,” as well as unnecessary

45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 528.
46. Id.
47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 451.
48. E.g., NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 77, 145, 542.
49. Id. at 542.
50. Id. at 631. Charles Pinckney spoke of “rights, privileges [and] properties” that
would need to be protected by checks and balances in the frame of government, without
any suggestion that these could be defended in a court of law. Id. at 182.
51. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON at 212 (Robert A. Rutland et al. ed., 1977).
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 535. The
premise that legislatures could enact laws circumventing enumerated prohibitions,
because courts could only declare a law void if it clearly violated the Constitution, is also
reflected in Hamilton’s discussion of liberty of the press: “Who can give it any definition
which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion?” THE FEDERALIST NO. 84
(Alexander Hamilton), id., at 580.
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and impolitic;53 implicitly, he did not anticipate that a court would
declare such a law void because it was unjust. Madison had used unjust
and unconstitutional as separate headings in notes for a speech opposing
paper money in 1786.54
Further evidence that the Framers did not expect the new federal
courts to invalidate state laws on grounds of violating natural rights is
found in the Judiciary Act enacted by the Federalist majority in the First
Congress. This law permitted the Supreme Court to determine the “validity”
of state statutes by writ of error only “on the ground of their being
repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States . . . .”55
This limitation of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction would have made no
sense if the Federalists wanted natural justice or natural law to be used in
deciding the validity of state statutes.
III. THE CASE LAW OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC
References to judicial review at the Constitutional Convention, I have
argued, reflected an expectation that the federal courts would enforce
some extratextual rights in exercising judicial review over state laws, but
not use injustice as a basis for declaring a statute void.56 The examples
of enforceable extratextual rights referred to by Convention delegates
were all rights having independent legal authority, such as those
arguably contained in the English constitution, as Americans commonly
conceived it.57 The federal courts of the early republic, leading scholars
have argued, did not always confine themselves to enforcing the new
written constitutions but also drew on so-called higher law—ahistorical
principles of natural law or social compact.58 If accurate, this would
mean that the federal courts exercised judicial review of a scope much
wider than that contemplated by the Framers during the Philadelphia
Convention.
A strikingly different understanding of the legal relevance of natural
law or social compact principles to judicial review was expressed by a
federal judge in 1830. Addressing the argument that a law should be

53. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 543.
54. 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 51, at 158–59.
55. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 85; see id. at 86 (“[N]o other error
shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal . . . .”).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 24–55.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18, 24–38.
58. GERBER, supra note 15, at 124–25; HAINES, supra note 8, at 206–08; WRIGHT,
supra note 1, at 293–97; SNOWISS, supra note 15, at 65–66; Edward S. Corwin, The
Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247, 253 (1914);
J.A.C. Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 56, 58–
63 (1931); Sherry, supra note 8, at 1168–76.
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held void because it violated natural justice, he said that doing so would
be unprecedented. “No court has yet presumed to question a legislative
act, on the ground of a difference with their notions of natural justice . . . . It
is the constitution that must be violated, and not any man’s opinions of
right and wrong, or his principles of natural justice.”59 This was an
accurate generalization, I contend, concerning federal courts reviewing
state statutes that restricted property rights or economic liberty.
Many such opinions that seem to rely on ahistorical principles of
higher law—natural law or the social compact—in their reasoning, or
seem to endorse in dictum the principle of using higher law to determine
the validity of statutes, actually referred to such concepts in an ultimately
historical, verifiable sense. The authority of such rules or principles was
derived from historically verifiable endorsement, not from higher law.
In reviewing state legislation restricting property or economic rights,
none of these judges ever asserted, even in dictum, that a right derived
from the law of nature or from the social compact could render a statute
void.60 Counsel earnestly pressed higher law arguments for overturning
statutes, and higher law principles were often mentioned in dictum. But
the courts’ opinions on constitutional issues relied on higher law principles
only when the positive fundamental law of the relevant jurisdiction
incorporated those principles.61 What the early federal courts actually
did is fairly close to what the Convention delegates had anticipated.
These courts did not confine themselves to enforcing the written
constitution of the jurisdiction, but they went outside the text only to
draw on the purported rights of Englishmen or on principles purportedly
shared in common by the American written constitutions as a group.
59. Livingston v. Moore, 15 F. Cas. 677, 683, 685 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830) (No. 8416),
aff’d, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833).
60. Other scholars have challenged the aptness of the higher law interpretation of
many of these cases, particularly those of the Supreme Court. See ROBERT LOWRY
CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888 (1985);
MATTHEW J. FRANCK, AGAINST THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE (1996); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John
Marshall, James Wilson, and the Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and
Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New Federal Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113
(2003).
61. All of the first thirteen states had formally adopted positive fundamental law of
some kind. Only eleven, however, had adopted written constitutions. Conventions in
Connecticut and Rhode Island had adopted their existing royal charters as fundamental
law. See 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 289–90; see also supra text accompanying note
30.
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The early federal judges avoided relying on higher law principles in
explaining their holdings.
Judicial reliance on human law rather than higher law had practical
importance; it meant that concretely pertinent historical evidence could
impose limits on the creativity judges might use in inferring constitutional
principles.62 And the distinction between reasoning from historical
evidence and reasoning from ahistorical concepts is of historiographical
importance because it tends to contradict the claim made by many
scholars that the property rights jurisprudence of the early federal courts
helped pave the way for the laissez-faire constitutionalism of the later
nineteenth century.63
A. Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance (1795)
Justice Patterson’s circuit court opinion in Van Horne’s Lessee v.
Dorrance states that “the right of acquiring and possessing property, and
having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights
of man” and that obtaining security for property “was one of the objects,
that induced [men] to unite in society.”64 It has been classified as an
instance of natural law reasoning.65 The beginning and ending of the
passage in which this language occurs, however, show that Patterson is
not citing natural law in its own right as authority for his decision.
Patterson derives his propositions of natural law from the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights adopted as part of the state constitution in 1776:
“I. That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are . . . acquiring,
possessing and protecting property . . . . VIII. That every member of

62.
63.

E.g., Commonwealth v. Lewis, 6 Binn. 266, 278 (Pa. 1814).
CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789–1835, at 417–18, 641 (1973); WRIGHT, supra note 1,
at 293; Corwin, supra note 58, at 253–54; James W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and
Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1061 (2000); Grant,
supra note 58, at 58.
64. Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795).
65. E.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 63 (3d ed. 2008); GERBER, supra note
15, at 68, 117–19; CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS
89 (1930); WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 293; Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in
Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement
of “Unwritten” Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421, 452 (1990); cf. SNOWISS, supra
note 15, at 68 (asserting that in Van Horne’s Lessee natural law principles are given
“disproportionate attention” over the constitutional text).
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society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and
property . . . .”66 After Patterson reads these provisions to the jury, he says:
From these passages it is evident; that the right of acquiring and possessing
property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable
rights of man. . . . The preservation of property then is a primary object of the
social compact, and, by the last Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a
fundamental law.67

Patterson refers to natural rights and the social compact, but not as
independently authoritative. It is only because the Pennsylvania
constitution has “made” them “fundamental law” in that state that these
objects of the social compact are legally relevant.
B. Calder v. Bull (1798)
Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull refers to the “purposes for
which men enter into society” and “the great first principles of the social
compact,”68 and has been classified as an example of higher law reasoning.69
But Chase’s argument that legislative power is subject to implied limits
ultimately relies on evidence that is historical in character, not on a
hypothetical social compact. The social compacts Chase relies on are
the recently adopted state and federal constitutions: “The people of the
United States erected their Constitutions, or forms of government, to
establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings
of liberty, and to protect their persons and property from violence.”70
Chase uses the asserted commonality of “certain vital principles in our
free Republican governments”71 because Connecticut lacked a written

66. 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3082–83 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
67. Van Horne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added).
68. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
69. ELY, supra note 65, at 63; GERBER, supra note 15, at 118–19; WRIGHT, supra
note 1, at 294; Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil
War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 376 (1911); Walter F. Dodd, Extra-Constitutional
Limitations Upon Legislative Power, 40 YALE L.J. 1188, 1193 (1930); Grant, supra note
58, at 58–59; Charles Grove Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial
Decisions, 25 YALE L.J. 617, 628 (1916); Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law
Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 49, 78 (1992); Michael, supra
note 65, at 452; Sherry, supra note 8, at 1172–73.
70. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388.
71. Id.
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revolutionary constitution comparable to those of other states.72 Chase’s
assertion that legislatures were subject to implied limitations refers not
to every legislature, as in the writings of “speculative jurists,”73 but to a
“Federal, or State Legislature.”74 Chase thus claims to derive his
conclusions from historical evidence, not the ipse dixit of higher law
reasoning. Chase asserts that an American legislature would be exceeding
its authority if it authorized “manifest injustice by positive law.”75 But
this claim does not depend on natural law; it parallels the argument
Federalist advocates had made so often during the ratification process:
that existing extratextual rights would remain available to citizens even
if the Constitution lacked a bill of rights.76 Chase’s claim that the recent
American constitutions had been formed to achieve “security” for
“personal liberty” and “private property” is historical in character.77
Chase’s argument does not depend on inferring the terms of an
ahistorical agreement from principles of natural justice. Instead he invokes
a purportedly common knowledge among his readers, based on their shared
historical personal experience.78 His characterization of legislative power is
72. Connecticut declared its independence by an act of the legislature stating that
the colony charter of 1662 would “remain the Civil Constitution of this State.” 1
SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 289–90. The Act contained a very brief recital of rights,
consisting essentially of due process. Id. at 290. Connecticut’s judiciary had already
twice held an act of the legislature invalid, without identifying a pertinent source of
fundamental law. See Treanor, supra note 7, at 487–89. The Connecticut courts may
have been tacitly relying on Connecticut’s royal charter of 1662, which granted colonists
“all Liberties and Immunities of free and natural Subjects within any the Dominions of
Us, Our Heirs or Successors, to all Intents, Constructions and Purposes whatsoever, as if
they and every of them were born within the realm of England,” and authorized the
assembly to make “all manner of wholesome, and reasonable Laws, Statutes, Ordinances,
Directions, and Instructions, not Contrary to the Laws of this Realm of England.” 5
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 66, at 533; see Wilkinson v. Leland, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 656–57 (1829).
73. “It is true, that some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against
natural justice must, in itself, be void . . . .” Calder, 3 U.S. at 398 (Iredell, J.). Justice
Iredell denies that courts have the power to declare a statute “void, merely because it is,
in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice,” and observes that “ideas
of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and purest men have
differed upon the subject . . . .” Id. at 399. Iredell’s strictures have been read as directed
towards Chase, but this may not have been the case. Justice Iredell had already made the
same argument at greater length in Minge v. Gilmour, 17 F. Cas. 440, 444 (C.C.D.N.C.
1798) (No. 9631). Chase was a judge, not a jurist, and his opinion in Calder does not
rely on any ahistorical principles of natural justice.
74. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388.
75. Id.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 36–37.
77. Calder, 3 U.S. at 388.
78. In contrast, Chase uses an explicitly speculative tone in referring to the origins
and status of property rights:
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framed specifically for American legislatures rather than legislatures
everywhere.
The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they may declare new
crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; they
may command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change
innocence into guilt; or punish innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an
antecedent lawful private contract; or the right of private property. To maintain
that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been
expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether
inadmissible in our free republican governments.79

Chase appeals here to empirical evidence, his readers’ supposed familiarity
with the principles of “our free republican governments,” not to a higher
law derived from an abstract, ahistorical social compact.
Finally, although Chase seems to be asserting that the legislature’s
power is subject to substantive written limitations, his reasoning ultimately
takes the form of an interpretive presumption: “It is against all reason
and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such powers; and,
therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.”80 Similarly,
Chase says it is “not to be presumed, that the federal or state legislatures
will pass laws to deprive citizens of rights vested in them by existing
laws; unless for the benefit of the whole community; and on making full
satisfaction.”81 Plainly, principles that a society might choose whether
or not to adopt are not principles of higher law.
C. Fletcher v. Peck (1810)
In Fletcher v. Peck, the Yazoo Land Case, the Court held that a state
was barred from annulling its own grant, even if procured by fraud, of
land now held by a third party who had purchased the land for value
with no notice of the fraud.82 Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion has been
understood as relying on higher law or social compact reasoning as at
It seems to me, that the right of property, in its origin, could only arise from
compact express, or implied, and I think it the better opinion, that the right, as
well as the mode, or manner, of acquiring property, and of alienating or
transferring, inheriting, or transmitting it, is conferred by society; is regulated
by civil institutions, and is always subject to the rules prescribed by positive
law.
Id. at 394 (first and fourth emphases added).
79. Id. at 388–89.
80. Id. at 388.
81. Id. at 394.
82. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810).
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least an alternative basis for the holding.83 Some of Marshall’s remarks
do seem to rely on higher law:
[T]here are certain great principles of justice, whose authority is universally
acknowledged, that ought not to be entirely disregarded.
....
It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does
not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and, if any be prescribed,
where are they to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly
acquired, may be seized without compensation[?]
. . . [T]he state of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which
are common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the
constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the
plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally
impaired and rendered null and void.84

But the “great principles of justice, whose authority is universally
acknowledged” 85 come from the English legal tradition, as it was
commonly conceived by contemporary American writers, rather than
from natural law or natural rights.
When Marshall questions whether the State of Georgia can rightfully
“claim to itself the power of judging in its own case,”86 he is alluding to
one of Chief Justice Coke’s own examples of a statute “against common
right and reason” that “the common law adjudges . . . as to that point void.”87
He does not insist on this, though, going on to argue that if Georgia
could rescind a conveyance by statute rather than by litigation—

83. GERBER, supra note 15, at 120; HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT,
supra note 63, at 326; SNOWISS, supra note 15, at 126; Corwin, supra note 58, at 253;
Grant, supra note 58, at 59–60; Massey, supra note 69, at 77–78; Michael, supra note
65, at 474; William Wiecek, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought: Preface to
the Modern Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE: WRITING THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 64, 70 (Sandra F. VanBurkleo et al. eds., 2002);
Wilmarth, supra note 60, at 126.
84. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133, 135, 139 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 133.
86. Id.
87. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 653 (K.B. 1610); see id. at 654 (“[I]f
any Act of Parliament gives to any to hold . . . pleas arising before him within his manor
of D., yet he shall hold no plea, to which he himself is a party . . . .”). Marshall’s
assertions that a contrary result would make all land titles “insecure” and seriously
obstruct “the intercourse between man and man,” and that the power exercised by the
Georgia legislature would “devest any other individual of his lands, if it shall be the will
of the legislature so to exert it,” Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133–34, follow Coke’s method of
demonstrating that a statute is against common reason: asserting that its principle would
lead to absurd results in other cases. See Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 654 (arguing
that if a certain statute is upheld, then logically “every common seal shall be defeated
upon a simple surmise, which cannot be tried”).
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“performing a duty usually assigned to a court”88—it would nonetheless
be “equitable,”—rescission being an equitable remedy—and that “its
decision should be regulated by those rules which would have regulated
the decision of a judicial tribunal.”89 Here again Marshall draws on
English legal tradition rather than higher law: a “court of chancery . . .
would have been bound, by its own rules, and by the clearest principles
of equity, to leave unmolested those who were purchasers, without
notice, for a valuable consideration.”90 What makes this conclusion
authoritative for an American court, in Marshall’s view, is that it follows
“rules of property . . . common to all the citizens of the United States”
and “principles of equity which are acknowledged in all our courts.”91
These are rules and principles, in other words, “whose authority is
universally acknowledged” throughout the United States.92 Marshall
speculates, but does not assert, that “the nature of society and of
government” prescribes “some limits to the legislative power,” but the
implied limitation he suggests is, again, conventional in English and
American fundamental law: that “the property of an individual, fairly
and honestly acquired,” may not be “seized without compensation.”93

88. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133. In Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 398, 397–401
(1798), the Supreme Court had held that the Connecticut assembly did not overstep its
authority by ordering a new trial in a civil case, overruling an earlier court ruling,
because the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution applies solely to criminal and not
civil cases. A court proceeding was the “mode” which “the common sentiment, as well
as common usage of mankind, points out” for seeking to “set aside a conveyance
obtained by fraud.” Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133.
89. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 133.
90. Id. at 134.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 133.
93. Id. at 135. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *139:
If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private
person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; . . . [but] the
public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of
every individual's private rights . . . . [T]he legislature alone can . . . interpose,
and compel the individual to acquiesce . . . [n]ot by absolutely stripping the
subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full
indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained.
Id.
By 1810 an express compensation requirement was contained in several state
constitutions as well as in the Federal Bill of Rights, and the principle of compensation
was conventional. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X; OHIO CONST.
art. VIII, § 4; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 10; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. II; James W. Ely, Jr., “That
due satisfaction may be made:” the Fifth Amendment and the Origins of the
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Marshall’s reasoning, moreover, would be essential to the case only
“were Georgia a single sovereign power.”94 But Georgia is part of the
“American union,” with its “constitution the supremacy of which all
acknowledge, and which imposes limits to the legislatures of the several
states, which none claim a right to pass.”95
Marshall then proceeds to interpret the Contracts Clause, reinforcing
“the natural meaning of words”96 with an account of the views of the
Framers and the understanding of the ratifiers:
If, under a fair construction of the constitution, grants are comprehended under the
term contracts, is a grant from the state excluded from the operation of the
provision? . . .
The words themselves contain no such distinction. They are general, and are
applicable to contracts of every description. If contracts made with the state are
to be exempted from their operation, the exception must arise from the character
of the contracting party, not from the words which are employed.
Whatever respect might have been felt for the state sovereignties, it is not to
be disguised that the framers of the Constitution viewed with some apprehension,
the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and that
the people of the United States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested a
determination to shield themselves and their property from the effects of those
sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed. The restrictions on the
legislative power of the states are obviously founded in this sentiment . . . .97

What has been regarded as higher law reasoning appears again in
Marshall’s concluding statement:
It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the court that, in this case, the estate
having passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration,
without notice, the state of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles
which are common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the
constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the
plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally
impaired and rendered null and void.98

These remarks do not imply higher law reasoning on Marshall’s part.
The “general principles which are common to our free institutions” are
those recited or implied in the American constitutions,99 not the principles
of an imagined, ahistorical social compact. And his reference to “general
principles which are common to our free institutions” is explicitly stated

Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1, 15–16, 18 (1992).
94. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 136.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 138.
97. Id. at 137–38 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
99. Id. This recalls Justice Chase’s reasoning in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386, 388 (1798). See supra text accompanying notes 68–81.
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in the alternative in order to comprehend Justice Johnson’s reasoning.
Marshall, characteristically, wants to characterize the Court’s position as
unanimous, but Justice Johnson explicitly denies that the Contracts
Clause justifies overturning the Georgia statute, and instead invokes “the
reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even on
the deity.”100 Marshall does not endorse Johnson’s rationale here. He
merely describes it, in the alternative, as part of a unanimous result.
Justice Johnson’s use of the phrase “general principle, the reason and
nature of things” certainly sounds like higher law, especially since it appears
in the same sentence as “the deity.”101 But the reasoning Johnson uses to
explain himself suggests instead that his thinking was entirely earthbound.
The “things” whose “nature” lead Johnson to deem the Georgia law
invalid are the substance of the transaction and dispute viewed in
conventional legal and political terms, not eternal principles of natural
justice.102 Johnson deals in principles of government, not natural rights,
when he insists on the distinction between a sovereign’s “right of
jurisdiction” and its “right of soil.”103 Of the same character is Johnson’s
assertion that a sovereign’s possessions “may be parted with in every
respect similarly to those of the individuals who compose the community”
because its possessions are “entirely accidental” and “in no [way] necessary
to its political existence.”104 His conclusion that property conveyed by
the public becomes thereby “vested” in the recipient tracks a concept of
the common law.105 Johnson’s premise that the acts of the “supreme
power” “must be considered pure for the same reason that all sovereign
acts must be considered just; because there is no power that can declare
them otherwise” is the antithesis of higher law reasoning.106 Johnson’s
effort to demonstrate the “absurdity” of the opposing argument is a
familiar device in common law reasoning.107 On the question of whether
Georgia had held the lands in question in fee simple, despite the rights of
Indian tribes, Johnson reasons from “technical principles.”108 His “just

100.
101.
102.
of title.”
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 143.
Id.
Similarly, Marshall says that the issue in Fletcher is “in its nature, a question
Id. at 133.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 144.
Id.; see, e.g., Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 654 (K.B. 1610).
Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 146.
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view of the State of the Indian Nations” is derived from the evidence of
treaties, laws, and land purchases, and not from natural law principles.109
And the nature of Georgia’s title follows from “our law,” which “will
not admit” the idea of a fee simple estate “being limited after a feesimple.”110 Thus, Johnson’s “general principle” of “the reason and nature
of things” makes essentially the same kind of appeal to conventional
legal reasoning as Marshall’s “great principles of justice, whose
authority is universally acknowledged.”111
D. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler (1814)112
A New Hampshire statute required a landowner suing to recover
possession of real property to pay compensation for the value of
improvements made by a tenant who had peacefully occupied the
premises for more than six years with color of title.113 A landowner
subject to this statute challenged it on the ground that it was “repugnant
to natural justice,” besides violating the federal and state constitutions.114
In the course of holding the statute unconstitutional under the New
Hampshire constitution, Justice Story says that applying a statute to
“past cases” is “against natural justice.”115 But this statement does not
mean that Story endorses the landowner’s claim that the statute was void.
Rather, he construes a provision in the state constitution prohibiting
“[r]etrospective laws” as “highly injurious, oppressive and unjust”;116 the
issue as he poses it is whether the law before him is a retrospective law
within the meaning of the state constitution.117 Notably, Story refrains
from reading the state constitution’s retrospectivity clause on its face as
banning all retrospective laws, and from applying the Federal Contracts
Clause because the law in question impaired “vested rights.”118 Story
cites but does not endorse Chancellor Kent’s categorical condemnation

109. Id. at 146–47.
110. Id. at 147.
111. Id. at 133.
112. 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156).
113. Id. at 767–68.
114. Id. at 766.
115. Id. at 768.
116. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XXIII, in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 66, at 2456.
117. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 767.
118. Id.; cf. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (“[C]onveyances
have vested legal estates, and . . . that they originally vested is a fact, and cannot cease to
be a fact.”). “[T]he people of the United States,” in ratifying the Constitution, “have
manifested a determination to shield themselves and their property” from arbitrary state
legislation. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 138.

842

HART.FINAL.DOC

[VOL. 45: 823, 2008]

10/15/2008 10:14:14 AM

Human Law, Higher Law, and Property Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

of retrospective laws,119 saying only that “in a fit case” he would “go a
great way” with Kent’s analysis.120
E. Terrett v. Taylor (1815)
A Virginia statute of 1801 asserted public ownership of lands
belonging to the Episcopal Church, an established church up until 1776.
In Terrett v. Taylor, a case coming from the part of the District of
Columbia ceded to the federal government by Virginia, the Supreme
Court held that the statute was void as an attempt to:
repeal statutes creating private corporations, or confirming to them property
already acquired under the faith of previous laws, and by such repeal . . . vest
the property of such corporations exclusively in the state, or dispose of the same
to such purposes as they may please, without the consent or default of the
corporators . . . .121

119. See Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 505–06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811):
An ex post facto law, in the strict technical sense of this term, is usually
understood to apply to criminal cases, and this is its meaning, when used in the
Constitution of the United States; yet laws impairing previously acquired civil
rights are . . . equally to be condemned. We have seen that the cases in the
English and in the civil law apply to such rights; and we shall find, upon
further examination, that there is no distinction in principle, nor any
recognized in practice, between a law punishing a person criminally, for a past
innocent act, or punishing him civilly by devesting him of a lawfully acquired
right. The distinction exists only in the degree of the oppression . . . .
Id. See also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 303–04 (1827) (Thompson, J.,
concurring):
No State Court would, I presume, sanction and enforce an ex post facto law; if
no such prohibition was contained in the constitution of the United States; so,
neither would retrospective laws, taking away vested rights, be enforced. Such
laws are repugnant to those fundamental principles, upon which every just
system of laws is founded. It is an elementary principle adopted and
sanctioned by the Courts of justice in this country, and in Great Britain,
whenever such laws have come under consideration, and yet retrospective laws
are clearly within this prohibition.
Id. See also id. at 304–05:
[B]ills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every
principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the
declarations prefixed to some of the State constitutions, and all of them are
prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters.
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), supra note 10, at 281).
120. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 767.
121. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815).
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Justice Story’s opinion for the Court refers to “the common sense of
mankind and the maxims of eternal justice,” “principles of civil right,”
“the principles of natural justice,” and “the fundamental laws of every
free government,”122 among other extra-constitutional principles, and is
widely cited as a classic instance of higher law reasoning.123
The conceptual context of the quoted remarks, however, is the
prerevolutionary American Whig understanding of an English constitution
that imposed substantive limits on the power of Parliament. Chief
Justice Coke’s famous assertion in Bonham’s Case that “when an Act of
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant . . . the
common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void,”124 had
been taken as axiomatic by many Americans since before the Revolution.125
When Story asserts that the churches’ property was “indefeasibly vested” in
their legal agents,126 he is not asserting a natural rights principle that
vested rights can never be impaired, or that no vested rights are
defeasible. His point is that the title to this particular property is
indefeasible because the rules of English common law on this point are
part of Virginia’s fundamental law, and none of the ways one might lose
vested rights under the English common law applied in this case. The
fact that the property had been “generally purchased by the parishioners,
or acquired by the benefactions of pious donors,” rather than “originally
granted by the state or the king,”127 was significant because this put the
property beyond the reach of the English common law principle that
grants might be resumed by a grantor for breach or nonperformance of
an implied condition.128 The English common law also authorized forfeiture
of vested property to the Crown for certain kinds of offenses.129 But this
exception to the common law’s protection of vested property was also
foreclosed: the property “was not forfeited; for the churches had
committed no offence.”130
When Story says that “dissolution of the regal government” did not
destroy “the right to possess or enjoy this property,” or dissolve “civil

122. Id. at 50–52.
123. SNOWISS, supra note 15, at 136; WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 296–97; Dodd,
supra note 69, at 1193 & n.24; Ely, Marshall Court, supra note 63, at 1049–50; Grant,
supra note 58, at 60–61; Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial
Decisions, supra note 69, at 640; Sherry, supra note 8, at 1175.
124. 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610).
125. See supra text accompanying note 17.
126. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 49.
127. Id.
128. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *152–53.
129. Id. at 267–68.
130. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 50.
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rights” or abolish “the common law,”131 he paraphrases provisions of the
Virginia Declaration of Rights.132 Story invokes “a principle of the common
law that the division of an empire creates no forfeiture of previously
vested rights of property,” and remarks that this principle “is equally
consonant with the common sense of mankind and the maxims of eternal
justice.”133 But associating a rule of positive law with natural justice
was a conventional way of commending the positive law;134 Story does
not say “the maxims of eternal justice” have independent legal force.
He quickly sidesteps the foregoing reasoning anyway: “admitting that,
by the revolution, the church lands devolved on the state, the statute of
1776, ch. 2, operated as a new grant and confirmation thereof to the use
of the church.”135
Assuming arguendo that the churches derived their property from the
statute of 1776, Story next considers whether the state could revoke this
grant. Because Story has already established that under English common
law there is no basis for resuming the grant based on breach of implied
condition or on forfeiture for nonperformance of implied condition, it
follows that the only way the churches could lose their property would
be if a legislative grant were “revocable in its own nature, and held only
durante bene placito.”136 Story’s assertion that such a premise would be
“utterly inconsistent with a great and fundamental principle of a
republican government, the right of the citizens to the free enjoyment of
their property legally acquired,” again reflects premises stated in the

131. Id.
132. Id. See the VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776):
That all men . . . have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a
state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity;
namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
Id.; see also id. § 8 (“[T]hat no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the
land or the judgment of his peers.”); id. § 11 (“That in controversies respecting property,
and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other,
and ought to be held sacred.”); 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 66, at
3813–14.
133. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 50.
134. E.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*121–23; see also Hamburger, supra note 19, at 18; REID, supra note 18, at 90–92.
135. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 50.
136. Id.
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Virginia Declaration of Rights, as well as in other states’ constitutions137
and in prior Supreme Court opinions.138
Story next turns to the status of the churches as corporations,
established by an Act of 1784 that had been later repealed. The common
law was “a tacit condition annexed to the creation of every such
corporation;” Story asks whether the circumstances fit any of the ways a
private corporation could “loose its franchises” under the common
law.139 A common law proceeding of quo warranto might be used in
cases of “a misuser or a nonuser” of a private corporation’s privileges,
but no such proceeding had been instituted here, nor had the legislature
alleged misuser or nonuser.140 Responding to Virginia’s claim that the
Act of 1784 violated its own constitution and bill of rights, Story
concedes that “a change of government” would permit terminating
whatever “exclusive” corporate privileges were “inconsistent with the
new government.”141 But it is dispositive here, Story argues, that the
contrary understanding of the state constitution had been acted on by
Virginia’s “former legislatures from the earliest existence of the
constitution itself,” in statutes “promulgated or acquiesced in by a great
majority, if not the whole, of the very framers of the constitution.”142
Summarizing this line of common law analysis, Story denies that “the
legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations, or confirm[]
to them property already acquired under the faith of previous laws” in
the absence of a common law basis for repealing a legislative charter or
grant.143
Story concludes his constitutional analysis grandly: “[W]e think ourselves
standing upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental
137. Id. at 50–51; see VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776) (“That all men
. . . have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property . . . .”); 7 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 66, at 3813.
138. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388–89 (1798) (“The Legislature . . .
cannot . . . violate . . . the right of private property. To maintain that our federal, or state
legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly restrained; would, in
my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free republican
governments.”); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (“[W]here are
[inherent limits to legislative power] to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly
and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation[?]”).
139. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 51; see Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292,
333 (1815) (Story, J.) (“[W]e take it to be a clear principle that the common law in force
at the emigration of our ancestors is deemed the birth right of the colonies unless so far
as it is inapplicable to their situation, or repugnant to their other rights and privileges.”).
140. Terrett, 13 U.S. at 51.
141. Id. at 51–52.
142. Id. at 51.
143. Id. at 52.
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laws of every free government, upon the spirit and the letter of the
constitution of the United States, and upon the decisions of most
respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting such a doctrine.”144 But given
that Story’s argument up to this point consists of a methodical analysis
of common law principles supposedly adopted by Virginia as part of its
fundamental law, it is unlikely that Story means to rest his holding partly
on natural justice, mentioned now for the first time without explanation
or elaboration.145 The usual reason for asserting that some other legal
tradition would reach the same result as the common law was to emphasize
the soundness of the common law position, not to attribute independent
authority to the other tradition.146 Story’s sweeping reference to other
kinds of law as supporting his decision should be seen as a response to
anticipated criticism of the opinion for treating common law rules as
fundamental law.147
F. Johnson v. McIntosh (1823)
In Johnson v. McIntosh, determining the validity of title conveyed by
Indian tribes, Chief Justice Marshall makes many references suggestive
of higher law reasoning.148 Marshall says deciding the case requires
examining “those principles of abstract justice, which the Creator of all
things has impressed on the mind of his creature man, and which are
admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of civilized nations,” as
well as principles of American law.149 He refers to “the rights of the
original inhabitants,” “the rightful occupants of the soil,” “natural right,”
and “universal law,” distances himself from the “pompous claims” of
European nations, and disclaims any intention of defending “those

144. Id.
145. Here, the fundamental laws of every free government refers to the state
constitutions in general. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–88 (1798); see
also Jones v. Shore’s Ex’r, 14 U.S. 462, 471 (1816) (Story, J.) (asserting that “the words
of a statute ought to be very clear” to prevail over an otherwise applicable “maxim of
natural justice”).
146. E.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*419; see R.H. Helmholz, Use of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary American
Jurisprudence, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1649, 1676–82 (1992).
147. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 578
(asserting that the common law is “liable to repeal by the ordinary legislative power” and
has “no constitutional sanction” under the New York constitution).
148. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 295.
149. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 572.
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principles which Europeans have applied to Indian title.”150 But the only
abstract principles Marshall even considers applying are those that have
been accepted and consistently acted on by European and American
governments; he dismisses other principles of the natural law treatise
tradition as “private and speculative opinions of individuals.”151 And
none of the natural law principles Marshall mentions that would support
the natives’ title to their own lands are given any effect where they
conflict with “the law of the nation in which they lie;” principles “which
our own government has adopted in the particular case, and given us as
the rule for our decision.”152
The discovery doctrine must be accepted by American courts as
authoritative, Marshall argues, because abundant historical evidence
shows it to be conventional among relevant nations—a principle
“recognised by all European governments, from the first settlement of
America.”153 Most importantly, the discovery doctrine is one to which
the United States had “unequivocally acceded,” which the United States
had “exercised uniformly over territory in possession of the Indians.”154
The discovery doctrine was recognized by “[a]ll our institutions,” and
had never been “questioned in our Courts.”155 The discovery doctrine
had been so continuously asserted and so widely acted on, Marshall
argues, that American courts cannot reconsider it.
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited
country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first
instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held
under it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it
becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.156

Here it becomes apparent that even the rules of international law
established among European powers have no independent legal authority

150. Id. at 574, 589–91, 595; see also id. at 573 (“The potentates of the old world
found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the
inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange
for unlimited independence.”). Marshall returned to this theme in Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 (1832).
151. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 588; see The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 115
(1825) (arguing that the slave trade “could not be considered as contrary to the law of
nations,” because it “was authorized and protected by the laws of all commercial
nations”).
152. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 572; see also Meade v. Deputy Marshal, 16 F. Cas. 1291,
1293 (C.C.D. Va. 1815) (No. 9372) (Marshall, J.) (“It is a principle of natural justice,
which courts are never at liberty to dispense with, unless under the mandate of positive
law, that no person shall be condemned . . . without an opportunity of being heard.”)
153. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 592.
154. Id. at 587–88.
155. Id. at 588.
156. Id. at 591.
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in Marshall’s analysis. Even if the discovery doctrine and its corollary
principles were “opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized
nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the country
has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two
people, it . . . certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice.”157
G. Corfield v. Coryell (1823)
Enforcing a New Jersey statue that reserved to state residents the right
of dredging for oysters in territorial waters, state officials seized a boat
owned by a non-resident.158 The boat’s owner challenged the constitutionality
of this law under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, among other
grounds.159 Circuit Justice Washington’s famous definition of privileges
and immunities uses many phrases evocative of the Declaration of
Independence and other higher law texts:
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to
the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed
by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental
principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate.
They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state
to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to
take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption
from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state;
may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of
citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental . . . .160

The entire passage is anchored to verifiable positive law, however, by
the qualifying phrase “which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of
their becoming free.”161 Thus Washington does not attribute independent
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 591–92 (emphasis added).
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 547–48 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551–52; see WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 294 n.1.
Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551 (emphasis added).
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legal authority to natural rights principles.162 A natural right that has not
been continuously enjoyed since 1776 in all thirteen states is not among
the privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution, according to
his formulation. This empirical anchor explains how Washington can
say that enumerating these privileges, although “tedious,” would not be
“difficult.”163 In contrast, a longstanding premise of natural rights discourse
was the impossibility of enumerating all the natural rights.164
H. Wilkinson v. Leland (1829)
Justice Story’s opinion for the Court in Wilkinson v. Leland declares
“[t]hat government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights
of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body,
without any restraint,” and that “[t]he fundamental maxims of a free
government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private
property should be held sacred.”165 Story’s opinion is widely regarded
as an example of higher law reasoning,166 but his argument deals in
162. See also United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S (2 Cranch) 358, 400 (1805) (“[I]f the
literal expressions of the law would lead to absurd, unjustified, inconvenient consequences,
such a construction should be given as to avoid such consequences, if, from the whole
purview of the law, and giving effect to the words used, it may fairly be done.”); Beach
v. Woodhull, 2 F. Cas. 1104, 1105 (C.C.D.N.J 1803) (No. 1154) (“The law is clearly
retrospective and unjust in its operation, but it is not for this court to correct it, or to
declare it a nullity. It is not repugnant to the constitution.”).
163. Corfield, 6 F. Cas at 551. Similarly, George Mason had said in the Federal
Convention that “with the aid of the State declarations [of rights] a [federal] bill might be
prepared in a few hours.” NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 5, at 630.
164. James Wilson had made this point in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
I consider there are very few who understand the whole of these rights. All the
political writers, from Grotius and Puffendorf down to Vattel, have treated on
this subject; but in no one of those books, nor in the aggregate of them all, can
you find a complete enumeration of rights appertaining to the people as men
and citizens. . . . Enumerate all the rights of men! I am sure, sir, that no
gentlemen in the late Convention would have attempted such a thing.
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 470 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976). In the North Carolina ratifying convention, on July 28, 1788, Samuel
Spencer asked for “a bill of rights, to secure those unalienable rights, which are called by
some respectable writers the residuum of human rights, which are never to be given up”
under any government. James Iredell responded, “No man, let his ingenuity be what it
will, could enumerate all the individual rights not relinquished by the Constitution. . . .
Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately
mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it.” 4 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 138,
149, 167 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836); see also Philip A. Hamburger, Natural
Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 942 (1993)
(“Commentators had long observed that natural law was so general and so imprecise that
it invited a variety of conflicting opinions about its requirements.”).
165. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829).
166. See WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 296–97; Dodd, supra note 69, at 1193; Ely,
supra note 63, at 1051; Gerber, supra note 15, at 243; Grant, supra note 58, at 63;
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historical inference—“the true extent of the power . . . granted” by the
people of Rhode Island to their legislature—rather than higher law.167
After a probate proceeding in New Hampshire, the executrix had
contracted to sell the decedent’s property in Rhode Island without
undertaking any probate proceedings there. Attempting to cure this
irregularity, the executrix then obtained from the Rhode Island legislature a
private act that ratified the transaction. The constitutionality of the private
act was challenged in the course of an action of ejectment.168 But Rhode
Island, like Connecticut at the time of Calder v. Bull, lacked a written
constitution.169 Instead, the “form of government” that a revolutionary
convention established at the time of the Revolution was based on the
colonial charter of 1663, which was therefore “now a fundamental law.”170
The charter’s definition of the legislature’s powers was itself vague, however,
providing merely that laws should “be not contrary to and repugnant
unto, but as near as may be agreeable to the laws, &c. of England,
considering the nature and constitution of the place and people there.”171
Story treats the question of the legislature’s power as a matter for
historical inference, not the application of higher law. In determining
whether “the people of Rhode Island have ever delegated to their
legislature the power to divest the vested rights of property, and transfer
them without the assent of the parties,” Story posits a series of historical
presumptions derived from historical circumstances, to be acted on in
the absence of contrary evidence:172
In a government professing to regard the great rights of personal liberty and of
property, and which is required to legislate in subordination to the general laws of
England, it would not lightly be presumed that the great principles of Magna
Charta were to be disregarded, or that the estates of its subjects were liable to be
taken away without trial, without notice, and without offence.173

Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation in the United States and the
Doctrines of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations on Legislatures, 2 TEX. L. REV.
257, 285 & n.65 (1924).
167. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 657.
168. Id. at 654–55.
169. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392–93 (1798); 1 THORPE, supra note 30,
at 129; see supra text accompanying notes 30–31.
170. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 656. Story speaks of whether the statute is
“constitutional” even though Rhode Island lacked a written constitution at this time. Id.
171. Id. at 657. The words replaced by “&c.” are “of this our realme.” See 6
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 66, at 3215.
172. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 658.
173. Id. at 657. This is consistent with Story’s view of the relevance of natural
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And even if the royal charter could be shown to have granted the
colonial assembly such extraordinary authority, it could “scarcely be
imagined” that the revolutionary process in Rhode Island “could have
left the people of that state subjected to its uncontrolled and arbitrary
exercise.”174
Story’s assertion that the “fundamental maxims of a free government
seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property
should be held sacred”175 does not mean the “fundamental maxims of a
free government” have an independent authority that courts must enforce.
Rather, Story argues that these are implicit terms of the “general grant of
. . . authority” from the people during Rhode Island’s “great event”176—
the Revolution—that established the powers of Rhode Island’s assembly.
To discern the unarticulated intentions of Rhode Island’s body politic at
that time, Story infers a commonality of basic governmental principles
among the people of the thirteen states in 1776. If the people of Rhode
Island had meant to adopt the same fundamental maxims of a free
government that other states’ revolutionary conventions had declared in
writing, Story argues, then it made sense to draw on those principles as a
source for interpretive inference. Therefore “no court of justice in this
country would be warranted in assuming, that the power to violate and
disregard” the rights of “personal liberty and private property” was
implied by “any general grant of . . . authority” or “general expressions of
the will of the people,” such as those found in the historical record in
Rhode Island.177
Story concedes that the people of Rhode Island might have intended to
authorize their legislature to violate the rights of personal liberty and
property, an authorization that would be binding, but treats this as an
unlikely historical claim that would have to be demonstrated rather than
inferred from silence. “The people”—here, those of Rhode Island—“ought
not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well
being, without very strong and direct expressions of such an intention.”178

justice in statutory construction. See Jones v. Shore’s Ex’r, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 462, 471
(1816) (asserting that “the words of a statute ought to be very clear” that would lead a
court to construe a statute against “a maxim of natural justice” and “the plainest rules of
equity”).
174. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 657.
175. Id. Story used the same language in his Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1393, at 268 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).
176. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 657.
177. Id. (emphasis added); see 3 STORY, supra note 175, § 1393, at 268.
178. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 657 (emphasis added); see 3 STORY, supra note 175,
§ 1393, at 269 (“The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights, so vital to their
security and well-being, without very strong and positive declarations to that effect.”).
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To fortify this premise, Story invokes the juridical experience of Rhode
Island’s sister states:
We know of no case, in which a legislative act to transfer the property of A to B
without his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative
power in any state of the union. On the contrary, it has been constantly resisted
as inconsistent with just principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has
been attempted to be enforced.179

Story does not argue that Rhode Island is bound by the principles
adopted by the other states; his point is that the Court should presume
that Rhode Island acted on the same principles as its sister states in 1776
unless there is unequivocal evidence to the contrary. Based on all this
circumstantial evidence and on the inferences drawn from it, the Court
was “not prepared therefore to admit that the people of Rhode Island
have ever delegated to their legislature the power to divest the vested
rights of property, and transfer them [from one named individual to
another] without the assent of the parties.”180 Thus the issue as Story
framed it was one of historical fact, not the dictates of higher law. In
concluding the passage, moreover, Story reveals that it has all been
dictum: “[C]ounsel for the plaintiffs have themselves admitted that they
cannot contend for any such doctrine.”181
After this digression, Story resolves the contested issues in the case in
a straightforward manner. The Rhode Island Act, construed “according
to the intention of the legislature, apparent upon its face,” leaves “no
reasonable doubt of its real object and intent . . . to confirm the sale
made by executrix, so as to pass the title of her testator to the purchasers,”
as the executrix had requested in her legislative petition.182 The Act did
not divest a vested interest “in a manner inconsistent with the principles
of [Rhode Island] law” because the devisee had taken an estate that
under Rhode Island law was “defeasible” to the extent of any liens
securing decedent’s debts.183 Given these conclusions, according to
Story, the only way to uphold the decision of the lower court would be
for the Supreme Court to declare categorically that “in a state not having

179. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 658; see 3 STORY, supra note 175, § 1393, at 268
(“[S]ince the American revolution no state government can be presumed to possess the
transcendental sovereignty, to take away vested rights of property.”).
180. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. at 658.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 662.
183. Id. at 658–59.
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a written constitution, acts of legislation, having a retrospective
operation, are void as to all persons not assenting thereto, even though
they may be for beneficial purposes, and to enforce existing rights.”184
Citing Calder v. Bull, Story denies that the Court had recognized any
such principle.185
I. Worcester v. Georgia (1832)
A missionary, convicted of violating a Georgia statute that prohibited
whites from entering Cherokee territory without a license from the
governor, alleged on appeal that his conviction was invalid because the
statute violated the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction over
Indian affairs.186 The issue before the Court was one of personal
liberty—the validity of the appellant’s criminal conviction—but Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court extensively discusses the
property rights of the Cherokee nation in concluding that Georgia’s
legislation was invalid. Although Marshall refers to higher law concepts
such as “natural justice” and “original natural rights,” he nowhere
implies that these rights have any legal authority of their own.187 Instead, as
in Johnson v. McIntosh,188 the legal relevance of such concepts comes
from being recognized or tacitly reflected in governmental acts. Thus
“natural justice” is relevant to his analysis because it is an explicit term
in an Indian treaty.189 The Indian nations’ “original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil” are relevant, in Marshall’s argument,
because they are part of the conventional understanding of the Indians’
land rights reflected in relevant federal treaties and laws,190 in earlier

184. Id. at 661.
185. Id.
186. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 515 (1832).
187. Id. at 550, 559; see WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 295.
188. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 604 (1823).
189. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 550.
190. Id. at 559. In addition, see id. at 556–57:
From the commencement of our government, congress has passed acts to
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations,
respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which
treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still
in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is
not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States.
Id.; see also id. at 543 (“[P]ower, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession,
are conceded by the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom they
descend.”).
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laws of the State of Georgia,191 and before American independence in
the documents and actions of colonizing nations.192
J. United States v. Percheman (1833)
After Spain ceded East Florida to the United States in 1819, federal
commissioners appointed to investigate Spanish land claims rejected the
evidence of title presented by Juan Percheman.193 When Percheman
nonetheless obtained a decree from a territorial court confirming his
title, the United States appealed.194 In the course of upholding the
decree confirming claimant’s title, Chief Justice Marshall appears to
invoke natural rights when he declares “that sense of justice and of right
which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be
outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and private
rights annulled.”195 These civilized principles of justice are potentially
relevant, however, only because they are embodied in the “modern usage
of nations, which has become law,”196 and would be given direct effect
only if the Treaty of 1819 contained “no stipulation respecting the
property of individuals.”197 But since the Treaty does address property
191. The Court remarks:
Georgia, herself, has furnished conclusive evidence, that her former opinions
on this subject concurred with those entertained by her sister states, and by the
government of the United States. Various acts of her legislature have been
cited in the argument, including the contract of cession made in the year 1802,
all tending to prove her acquiescence in the universal conviction that the Indian
nations possessed a full right to the lands they occupied, until that right should
be extinguished by the United States, with their consent . . . .
Id. at 560.
192. The Court further notes:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any
other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular
region claimed . . . .
Id. at 559; see also id. at 546 (“[Colonial charters] asserted a title against Europeans
only, and were considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were
concerned.”).
193. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (6 Pet.) 51, 57 (1833).
194. Id. at 59.
195. Id. at 87; see WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 294.
196. Percheman, 32 US. at 86.
197. Id. Chief Justice Marshall remarks, regarding Florida:
Had Florida changed its sovereign by an act containing no stipulation
respecting the property of individuals, the right of property in all those who
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rights, even “the usages of the civilized world” are not binding.198
Marshall consults them only as a presumptive guide for inferring the
intentions of the parties to the Treaty, in the absence of persuasive
evidence to the contrary.199
K. Livingston v. Moore (1833)
A Pennsylvania Act of 1785 authorized the state comptroller to
establish liens on the real estate of persons owing debts to the state,
without notice to the debtor, as if the state had secured a judgment
against the debtor in a court;200 later laws authorized the sale of property
subject to such liens. In federal circuit court, landowners who had purchased
property from the debtor complained that these laws violated various
provisions of the federal and state constitutions, and also that the
statutory procedure for establishing the lien violated “natural justice”
because of the lack of notice to the debtor.201 The circuit court flatly
rejected the relevance of natural justice to the validity of a statute:
No court has yet presumed to question a legislative act, on the ground of a
difference with their notions of natural justice; and no legislature would, or
ought to submit to such a restriction of their authority. . . .
....
. . . It is the constitution that must be violated, and not any man’s opinion of
right and wrong, or his principles of natural justice.202 . . . [The legislature is]

became subjects or citizens of the new government would have been unaffected by
the change. It would have remained the same as under the ancient sovereign.
Id. at 87.
198. Id. at 88–89.
199. Marshall States:
[T]he eighth article of the treaty . . . must be intended to stipulate expressly for
that security to private property which the laws and usages of nations would,
without express stipulation, have conferred. No construction which would
impair that security further than its positive words require, would seem to be
admissible.
Id. at 88 (emphasis added); see id. (“The treaty . . . conform[ed] exactly to the
universally received doctrine of the law of nations. If the English and Spanish
[language] parts can, without violence, be made to agree, that construction which
establishes this conformity ought to prevail.”) (emphasis added).
200. Livingston v. Moore, 15 F. Cas. 677, 681–83 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1830) (No. 8416),
aff’d, 32 U.S. 469 (1833).
201. Id. at 682–83.
202. See also id. at 682 (“It would be a bold step in this, or any other court, to
pronounce an act of a state legislature unconstitutional and void, on such general
opinions and principles [of natural justice], however just in themselves.”).
The circuit court further noted:
I might think notice to be a “substantial requisite of natural justice,” but in a
certain case, the legislature has thought otherwise; and they had a constitutional
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charged with oppression, injustice, partiality, an injurious departure from the
ordinary modes of proceeding, and a total disregard to the rights and interests of
others in the pursuit of the rights and interests of the state. If all this were true,
there may nevertheless be evils for which we are not authorized to administer a
remedy; there may be injuries we cannot redress . . . our power over the subject
is measured to us by the constitution, and we must take care that in our zeal to
redress real or supposed wrongs, we do not commit a greater wrong.203

The challenged laws must be enforced, the court declared, unless “they
violate any of the provisions of the constitution of the United States, or
of the constitution of Pennsylvania, and are so inconsistent with them, or
either of them, that it is the right and duty of the court to declare them to
be null and void.”204
In the Supreme Court the debtor’s heirs again argued, among other
grounds, that the state legislation was “inconsistent with the principles of
private rights and natural justice, and therefore void,” aside from any
violation of a constitutional provision.205 In affirming the result below,
the Court ignored the natural justice claim.206
Justice Johnson, however, after delivering the opinion of the Court,
gives his own reasons for concurring.207 Unlike the rest of the Court, which
ignores plaintiffs’ extratextual challenge to the Pennsylvania legislation,
and the circuit court below, which had condemned the idea of using “natural
justice” to determine the validity of statutes,208 Johnson addresses the
substance of plaintiffs’ arguments from “the principles of private rights
and natural justice.”209 Justice Johnson does not say that natural justice
is ordinarily relevant to the question of a statute’s constitutionality; his
right to think so, and to act upon their own opinion of this abstract question, as
well as of its application to the case they were providing for.
Id. at 683; see Beach v. Woodhull, 2 F. Cas. 1104, 1105 (C.C.D.N.J. 1803) (No. 1154)
(Washington, J.) (“The law is clearly retrospective and unjust in its operation, but it is
not for this court to correct it, or declare it a nullity. It is not repugnant to the constitution.”).
203. Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at 683, 685.
204. Id. at 685.
205. Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 540 (1833).
206. The Court stated:
[T]he words used in the constitution of Pennsylvania, in declaring the extent of
the powers of its legislature, are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the
powers exercised over the estate of Nicholson in the two acts under
consideration, and that there are no restrictions, either express or implied, in
that constitution, sufficient to control and limit the general terms of the grant of
legislative power to the bounds which the plaintiffs would prescribe to it.
Id. at 546.
207. Id.
208. Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at 683, 685.
209. Livingston, 32 U.S. at 540.
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point is that if Pennsylvania’s courts recognize natural justice as part of
the “law of the land,” the federal courts must accept this as part of the
state’s fundamental law.210
Johnson first counters plaintiffs’ argument that the Pennsylvania legislation
was inconsistent with “the reason and nature of things” because it was
“inconsistent” with the original “contract of grant” and was effectively
“a resumption of the land.”211 Johnson answers:
[S]ubjecting the lands of a grantee to the payment of his debts, can never impair
or contravene the rights derived to him under his grant, for in the very act, the
full effect of the transfer of interest to him is recognized and asserted: because it
is his, is the direct and only reason for subjecting it to his debts.212

Evidently the “things” whose “reason and nature” Johnson views as
relevant to natural justice here are matters of ordinary domestic law—
land grants and creditors’ remedies—rather than principles of higher
law. This is consistent with Johnson’s own use of the phrase “reason
and nature of things” in Fletcher v. Peck213 and in Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee,214 and with the use of this apparently conventional phrase by
others.215
210. See id. at 542 (“When [federal courts] find principles distinctly settled by
adjudications, and known and acted upon as the law of the land, we have no more right
to question them, or deviate from them, than could be correctly exercised by their own
tribunals.”). In the circuit court, plaintiffs had cited a Pennsylvania case for the
proposition that statutes must conform to “natural justice.” See Livingston, 15 F. Cas. at
682–83 (quoting Fitler’s Case, 12 Serg. & Rawle 277, 278–79 (Pa. 1825)).
211. Livingston, 32 U.S. at 550.
212. Id. at 550–51.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 101–111.
214. 14 U.S. 304, 372 (1816). Justice Johnson remarks:
It must here be recollected, that this is an action of ejectment. If the term
formally declared upon expires pending the action, the court will permit the
plaintiff to amend, by extending the term—why? Because, although the right
may have been in him at the commencement of the suit, it has ceased before
judgment, and without this amendment he could not have judgment. But
suppose the suit were really instituted to obtain possession of a leasehold, and
the lease expire before judgment, would the court permit the party to amend in
opposition to the right of the case? On the contrary, if the term formally
declared on were more extensive than the lease in which the legal title was
founded, could they give judgment for more than costs? It must be recollected
that, under this judgment, a writ of restitution is the fruit of the law. This, in its
very nature, has relation to, and must be founded upon, a present existing right
at the time of judgment. And whatever be the cause which takes this right
away, the remedy must, in the reason and nature of things, fall with it.
Id. at 371–72 (emphasis added).
215. Hamilton had used the phrase in describing how courts decide which of two
inconsistent statutes should be given effect:
The rule which has obtained in the courts for determining their relative validity
is that the last in order of time shall be preferred to the first. But this is mere
rule of construction, not derived from any positive law, but from the nature
and reason of the thing. It is a rule not enjoined upon the courts by legislative
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The other claim that Johnson characterizes as based on “the principles
of private rights and natural justice”216 is that “in this case the community
sits in judgment in its own cause, when it affirms the debt to be due for

provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety, for
the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the law. They thought it
reasonable, that between the interfering acts of an equal authority, that which
was the last indication of its will, should have the preference.
But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority,
of an original and derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate
the converse of that rule as proper to be followed. They teach us that the prior
act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and
subordinate authority . . . .
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 526 (emphasis added).
In Opinion of the Justices, 14 Mass. 470 (1784), the court considered whether the state
legislature had the power to fill vacancies in the Council, in the absence of an explicit
constitutional provision to that effect:
It seems very clear . . . that the constitution designed those offices should be
always filled, and that a council of nine persons should exist; and that in one
case of a vacancy, arising by an implied resignation, it is expressly provided
that it shall be filled up; which, from the reason and nature of things, implies a
constitutional power of filling up seats directly and positively vacated by death
or actual resignation.
Opinion of the Justices, 14 Mass. at 471 (second emphasis added); see Griswold v.
Stewart, 4 Cow. 457, 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (“The rule, that nothing which was a
defense to the original action can be pleaded in scire facias, applies only to the original
parties or to privies, not strangers. This is evident from the reason and nature of things.”
(second emphasis added)). In Emery v. Neighbour, 7 N.J.L. 142 (N.J. 1824), the court
was faced with a trust instrument whose terms did not expressly give a beneficiary the
power to make a testamentary disposition:
Do they then do so in the reason and nature of things? The money is to be
paid to the trustees, for her sole, separate, and exclusive use; it is to be paid in
consideration of her relinquishment of her conjugal rights, generally the most
precious, and by far the most important of all the rights that woman can
possess; it is to be paid as a sum in gross, not in annual, monthly, or weekly
payments, nor as a principal to raise an annual interest for her annual support;
it is to be subject, in the hands of the trustees, to her sole order and disposition.
It would be difficult to find words to create an estate, in money, for the
separate use of the femme, of more extensive and unlimited import.
Id. at 148 (first emphasis added). In Davies v. Powell, 125 Eng. Rep. 1013, 1014 (C.P.
1738), the court gave the following reasons for departing from a traditional common law
rule holding that deer were not distrainable:
[T]he nature of things may in time change; it is now well known [deer] are
become chattels of profit, and the practice of grasing so general, as to be
deemed a good improvement of a farm; the reason of this thing therefore being
altered, the law must vary with it.
We are all agreed, that these deer upon all the circumstances of this case,
were properly distrainable.
Id.
216. Livingston, 32 U.S. at 540.
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which the land is subjected to sale, and then subjects the land to sale to
satisfy its own decision thus rendered.”217 Johnson’s response to this
claim indicates that he understands plaintiffs’ challenge to depend on
assessing the purposes and effects of ordinary legal phenomena rather
than deductions from higher law:
This view of the acts of the state, is clearly not to be sustained by a reference to
the facts of the case. As to the judgment of 1797, that is unquestionably a
judicial act; and as to the settled accounts, the lien is there created by the act of
men who, quoad hoc, were acting in a judicial character; and their decision
being subjected to an appeal to the ordinary, or rather the highest of the
tribunals of the country, gives to those settlements a decided judicial character:
and were it otherwise, how else are the interests of the state to be protected?
The body politic has its claims upon the constituted authorities, as well as
individuals; and if the plaintiffs’ course of reasoning could be permitted to
prevail, it would then follow, that provision might be made for collecting the
debts of every one else, but those of the state must go unpaid, whenever
legislative aid became necessary to both. This would be pushing the reason and
nature of things beyond the limits of natural justice.218

L. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Van Ness (1835)
After an act of Congress authorized a railroad to condemn land in the
District of Columbia, an affected landowner brought suit challenging the
statute’s validity.219 One of the grounds for challenge was that the
statute took “private property for private use, which is not authorized by
the constitution.”220 Circuit Judge Cranch states that taking private
property “for private use, with just compensation” is “not within the
prohibition of the constitution” but “would be an arbitrary proceeding.”221
In determining whether or not the statute effectively takes property for
private use, Cranch considers the statute’s purposes, its effects, and the
logical implications of other statutes governing the railroad’s operations:

217. Id. at 551. A law authorizing one to judge in his own case was one of Chief
Justice Coke’s examples of a statute contrary to “common right and reason” that “the
common law adjudges . . . as to that point void.” Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646,
653 (K.B. 1610); see id. at 654 (“[I]f any Act of Parliament gives to any to hold . . . pleas
arising before him within his manor of D., yet he shall hold no plea, to which he himself
is a party . . . .”). See also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *91:
[I]f an act of parliament gives a man power to try all causes, that arise within
his manor . . . ; yet, if a cause should arise in which he himself is party, the act
is construed not to extend to that; because it is unreasonable that any man
should determine his own quarrel.
Id.
218. Livingston, 32 U.S. at 551 (emphasis added).
219. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. 574 (C.C.D.C.1835) (No. 830).
220. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. at 575–76.
221. Id. at 576.
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[T]his railroad, although it may be profitable to the stockholders, is also a great
public benefit. It does not prevent the public from enjoying all the advantages
which they enjoyed before, and gives them a cheaper, safer, and more expeditious
mode of travelling than they would otherwise have. If it may not be called a
common highway, yet it is really a common good. It is a great public convenience.
The land is really taken for public use. The condemnation of land, for such
purposes, has been so general, and so extensive, for many years, that it may well
be considered as established by the law of the land. Every state of the Union
has granted charters for such objects, with similar powers. The rates of toll,
&c., are established by law, which could not be done unless the object was of a
public nature; nor would the legislature have power to restrain them in the
exercise of their private rights. The state of Maryland also has a great interest in
the road, as it is to receive five per cent. upon the gross receipts of tolls from
passengers; and has an option to take a large portion of the stock within a
limited time after the completion of the road. The condemnation of the land,
therefore, is clearly for the Maryland public use; even if it be not for the use of
the whole American public.222

Concluding, the court says that the statute does not contravene “any of
the principles of natural justice,”223 but, not having used the term earlier,
leaves it unclear what it means by natural justice. The opinion seems to
suggest that the statute does not contravene natural justice because it is
not “arbitrary,”224 and that the statute is not arbitrary because even though
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. Other federal opinions show the term natural justice being used to mean
that a result is reasonable in the context of relevant doctrinal principles, rather than as the
application of higher law reasoning. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 438–39 (1815)
(Story, J.):
The resistance of the convoy is the resistance of all the ships associated under
the common protection, without any distinction whether the convoy belong to
the same or to a foreign, neutral sovereign—for upon the principles of natural
justice, a neutral is justly chargeable with the acts of the party, which he
voluntarily adopts, or, of which he seeks the shelter and protection. . . . —these
principles are recognized . . . ; and can never be shaken without delivering over
to endless controversy and conflict the maritime rights of the world.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Greene v. Darling, 10 F. Cas. 1144, 1147–48 (C.C.R.I.
1828) (No. 5765) (Story, J.):
The strong impression left upon my mind by other authorities is, that Lord
Mansfield's doctrine, as to the jurisdiction of set-off in equity, is not in its
general latitude, and without some qualifications, maintainable. It seems
irreconcileable with what fell from Lord Cowper, in Lanesborough v. Jones, 1
P. Wms. 326, who said, that “it was natural justice and equity, that in all cases
of mutual credit only the balance should be paid;” . . . . Lord Cowper here
relies on the fact of mutual credit, (by which I understand him to intend, a
credit founded on a knowledge of, and trust to, the existing debts,) as itself, in
a case of insolvency, furnishing an equity. . . .
The conclusion, which seems deducible from the general current of the
English decisions . . . is, that courts of equity will set off distinct debts, where
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the railroad might be “a private object, in itself” its overall character is
sufficiently public because the legislature “[has] deemed it to be so far a
public object as to be worthy of their control and regulation, and of the
exercise of their power to apply private property to its use, upon making
just compensation, to be ascertained by a jury”225 and because such
statutes are so widespread in America that their legitimacy “may well be
considered as established by the law of the land.”226
IV. CONCLUSION
The early federal courts are commonly regarded as having been
remarkably innovative in that they practiced judicial review without any
real authorization for doing so, they used judicial review to define property
rights much more expansively than would have been anticipated, and
they used timeless principles of natural or higher law to accomplish
this. I argue that the early federal courts were far less creative than this
account suggests. The Framers of the Federal Constitution seem to have
anticipated that the new federal courts would exercise the power of
judicial review without requiring specific authorization in a written
constitution. The Framers also seem to have expected that the federal
courts would employ the power of judicial review to protect some
conventional property rights not stated in constitutional provisions, but
stopping short of higher law. Finally, I contend, the pertinent case law
shows that the early federal courts essentially stayed within the Framers’
expectations in these respects. In determining the validity of statutes
affecting property rights, these courts drew on certain principles they
regarded as inherited from the English legal tradition or took to be
shared in common among the American constitutions, but they did not
rely on higher law for this purpose.

there has been a mutual credit, upon the principles of natural justice, to avoid
circuity of suits, following the doctrine of compensation of the civil law to a
limited extent.
Id. (emphasis added).
225. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. at 576. The court continues, “[W]e cannot say that the
provisions of the act, which authorize the condemnation of land, for such a road, are
void, as being unconstitutional, or as contravening any of the principles of natural
justice.” Id. The court cites Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 3 U.S. 304, 312 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1795) as illustrating the scope of a Pennsylvania constitutional provision formally
recognizing a natural right to possess property, not as showing a court’s direct
application of a natural rights principle. Van Ness, 2 F. Cas. at 576.
226. Id.
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